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H – 679

International Court of Justice

H0679 - 0002

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H0679 – 0003

I certify that none of the documents included herein have been denied by the Tribunal and that this document book has been examined with the prosecution in accordance with the ruling of the Tribunal dated 4 April 1946.

Je certifie qu'aucun des documents ci-inclus n'a été contesté par le Tribunal, et que ce livre de documents a été examiné par le Ministère Public suivant les règles du Tribunal, en date du 4 Avril 1946.

Ich bestaetige, dass keine der hierin enthaltenen Dokumente vom Gerichtshof abgelehnt wurden und dass dieses Dokumentenbuch gemeinsam mit der Anklagevertretung durchgesehen wurde, in Uebereinstimmung mit der Entscheidung des Gerichtshofes vom 4. April 1946.

Signature of Counsel
Signature de l'Avocat
Unterschrift des Verteidigers.

H0679 - 0004

Table of Contents

of

Document book : I

Constantin Baron von NEURATH

H0679 - 0005

lesignation	contents	date	Neurath No.
1. Documents concerning general political trend and personality of Baron von NEURATH			
		Document book I documents No. 1 to 30	
Affirmation in lieu of oath	Dr. Wurm	20 March 46	1
Affirmation in lieu of oath	Manfred ZIMMERMANN	1 May 46	2
Affirmation in lieu of oath	Baroness RITTER	28 May 46	3
Affirmation in lieu of oath	K. PRUEFER, Ambassador(retired)	16 April 46	4
Cipher telegram	B.von BUELOW, State Secretary in Foreign Office to Baron v. NEURATH	31 May 32	6
Letter	Dr.KOEPKE,Ministerial Director to Ambassador RUEMELIN	2 June 32	8
Article from "Time"	"Germany"	10 April 33	9
Letter Political Report	Baron v.NEURATH to HINDENBURG	19 June 33	11
Letter Political Report	Baron v. NEURATH to HITLER	19 June 33	12
Ambassador DODD's Diary	Excerpts	1933/37	13
Draft of letter	Baron v. NEURATH to HITLER	25 October 35	14

H0679-0006

Designation	contents	date	NEURATH No.
Memorandum US Doc. No. L-150	Conversation of U.S. Ambassador, Mr. BULLITT - v. NEURATH	18 May 36	15
Letter	von NEURATH to HITLER	27 July 36	16
Failure of a mission Henderson	Excerpts	1937/39	17
Addess	Nuncio Orsenigo, incidental to 65th birthday of v. NEURATH	2 February 38	18
Failure of a mission Henderson	Excerpts	28 September 38	20
Letter	Francois-Poncet	18 October 38	21
Declaration	Evangelical Ministerial and Parish Council Enzweihingen	6 May 46	24
Affidavit	Schwerin-Krosigk	18 May 46	25

H0679 - 0007

NEURATH No. 1

Defence Exhibit No. .....

Affirmation on lieu of oath by the Provincial Bishop Dr. Wurm of 20 March 1946.

H0679 - 0008

Filed June 22

NEURATH No. .....

Defense Exhibit No. ..1...

Affirmation in lieu of oath by Provincial Bishop Dr. Wurm

Provincial Bishop Dr. Wurm Stuttgart, 20. 3. 1946

Statement about Baron von Neurath,

I have become acquainted with Herr von Neurath at the time of church struggle. I thought I might apply to him as a compatriot and a descendant of a family which was in sympathy with the Evangelical Church. His father was a member of the Evanelical Provincial Synod. I have not been disappointed in this confidence. He has received me often and obtained for me numerous conferences with other members of the Reich Cabinet. He helped me especially in Autumn of 1934 together with the Minister of Interior Dr. Frick and the Reich Minister of Justice Dr. Guertner to get release from detention, as I was interned in my house, because of illegal interference by the Reich Bishop of that time, Mueller on account of my resistance to the domination of the church by the German Christians and dismissed from my office. He also achieved that I regained recognition by the State as Bishop and brought about a discussion in the Reich Chancellery, the result of which was the withdrawal of the illegal legislation by the Reich Bishop. During later periods of the church struggle I also found a constantly friendly reception and complete understanding by him for the concerns of the Church.

During these conferences, which touched at times also political spheres, I have found him as a men of great moderation and of extraordinary judgement. A passionate and fanatical disposition

H0679 – 0009

were apparently repugnant to him. He made no secret out of his natural antipathy against National Socialistic methods. I remember especially his sharp condemnation of occurences in Vienna at which Prime Minister Dolfuss was murdered and of the persons which were used by Hitler during the agitation in Austria. I could explain his exertions for entry into the Hitler government only by his duty towards Reich President von Hindenburg and his remaining in the Reich Cabinet also after 30 June 1934 and to help in preventing possibly disastrous development of events for the German people. It is easy today to dondemn such an attitude; but one must not leave out of sight that the great yielding of England and France in the foreign political steps of Hitler have extremely increased his and his party's power and authority. When at that time the governments of these states tried to avoid the conflict as long as possible, one could not make a reproach to a German statesman and certainly not to a simple official in Germany that he allowed a great deal to happen silently / which inwardly he could not approve. Baron von Neurath- - I could understand this from some of his utterances - did not give up the hope that the whole system will break down through its inner falseness.

I visited Herr von Neurath for the last time in February 1939, one year after his dismissal as Reich Minister. I remember especially clearly the conversation then, as it entered into the preliminary history of the Munich agreement on 1 October 1938. I asked Herr von Neurath what duties had fallen to him as the President of the "Secret Cabinet Council", to which he replied that this was never called together. For this purpose there was put at his disposal a very nice room in the new Reich Chancellery, but he made no use of it. He visited only the Reich Chancellery one more time and namely at the time of the crisis in November 1938. After the ineffectual outcome of the meeting of Hitler with the English Prime Minister Chamberlain.

H0679 - 0010

in Goldesberg, he received an impression there existed an immediate danger of war, and he considered it his duty to try everything to avert the calamity. He met Goering in the Reich Chancellery who went there for the same purpose. They succeeded to speak alone with Hitler, who was in conference with Goebbels and Ribbentrop. They confronted him that he takes a great responsibility upon himself if he declines the attempts of the English Government for an agreement. They emphasized it all the more as they were already informed by the British Ambassador that Chamberlain was prepared to come to Germany for the third time. Finally they succeeded to obtain a promise from Hitler for further negotiations, about which Goebbels was very disappointed. Herr von Neurath reported then in enthusiastic words about the days of Munich and the joy with which especially Chamberlain and Daladier were greeted by the population. One traced in him a real pleasure that he could contribute something for the maintenance of the peace. He left also no doubt that he condemns unreservedly a contrary policy.

I affirm in lieu of oath that I have made these statements to my best knowledge and conscience.

signed: Dr. Wurm.

Certified true copy.

signed Dr. Baron von Luedinghausen

(Dr. Baron von LUEDINGHAUSEN)

H0679 – 0011

(Page 5 of orig.)

NEURATH No. 2

Defense Exhibit No. V

Affirmation in lieu of oath of Manfred ZIMMERMANN, attorney-at-law and notary dated 1 May 1946

H0679 - 0012

(Page 6 of orig.
line 5 to end)

Affirmation in lieu of oath

In a newspaper, which I myself did not read, I was supposedly referred to as "father confessor" to the defendant Constantin Baron von NEURATH. I therefore would like to preface my declaration with the following" I have known Constantin von NEURATH since my early youth. Our fathers had been friends. We continued to see each other regularely, to talk together and corresponded with each other frequently. I owe my knowledge of the matter concerning which I am herewith declaring myself to this long friendship which binds me to Constantin von NEURATH; occasionally I also acted for him in my capacity as attorney and notary. What I am about to declare is throughout direct observation on my part; it is based on conversations and remarks by NEURATH which he expressed to me or in my presence, upon personal observations and experiences. Like NEURATH, I too am from Wuerttemberg! We Wuerttembergers are by nature conservative and adhere strongly to tradion and knowledge and experiences we have gained. The von NEURATH family have been in the service of the Wuerttemberg Court and State for generations, which holds true also in the case of the defendant, who among other things was also Chief of Cabinet of the King of Wuerttemberg. The von NEURATH family, particularely Konstantin von NEURATH, enjoy great respect and confidence in Wuerttemberg. Not only in Wuerttemberg but in the widest circles, Konstantin von NEURATH has been relied upon to be the man who would guard Germany against war who would maintain peace and, at the outbreak of the war, would attain peace for the German nation. I know from NEURATH himself that HINDENBURG shared this opinion and therefore expressly requested even under HITLER as Reich Chancellor, the Reich Foreign Minister

H0679 – 0013

act
was to/as if neither the charter of the League of Nations nor the Rhine pact which refers to this charter, were valid.

This result of the French-Soviet Treaty is not removed by the fact that France has made a proviso therein that she does not wish to be obligated to a military procedure against Germany, when such procedure would subject her to a sanction on the part of Italy and Great Britain, the guaranteeing powers. In respect to this proviso even the fact remains decisive that the Rhine pact is perhaps not based only on Great Britain's and Italy's obligations of guarantee, but primarily on the obligations established between France and Germany.

It is therefore a question only of whether France, in the assumption of these treaty obligations, has kept within the boundaries which were imposed upon her by the Rhine pact in connection with Germany.

H0679 – 0014

NEURATH told me personally: "I promised "the old man" – meaning HINDENBURG that I would remain in the Reich Ministry as long as possible in order to guarantee the continuity and peace of the German policy." NEURATH was frequently asked by friends and acquaintances how it was possible for him to be or to remain Reich Minister under HITLER; To this he always gave the same stereotyped answer which he had uttered to me! I know this through the many mutual acquaintances whom I have with NEURATH. During the years in which NEURATH lived in Berlin as Reich Minister, after his return from LONDON, where he had been Ambassador of the German Reich, we met regularely, speaking confidentially most of the time. Here we spoke regularely of political matters, particularely also about his position and task in the Reich Cabinet. From these discussions I know that NEURATH had an extremely difficult time, in the Cabinet, and that he nevertheless with Swabian stubbornness, carried out the peace policy he had promised to HINDENBURG and consistently rejected any policy of violence. That he thereby strove to lay aside the shackles of the Versailles Treaty was for him, as a German and Reich Minister, a matter of course. As a means to this end, he always designated the course of procedure and always rejected any violent measure. Therefore, for instance, in the reoccupation of the Rhineland, he ignored on act of aggression because he knew very well that Germany was by no means prepared for an attack and that Germany's lack of armaments was also well known abroad; This was his conception as I well know, According to his development, NEURATH was definitely not a National Socialist! Wherever he could , he put on the brakes. I know from personal conversations with him that he had to go through the most difficult struggles with leading National Socialists, particularly with HIMMLER. Shortly after his seventhieth birthday, NEURATH led me in his Berlin apartment to the picture which HITLER, on the occasion of his birthday, had given him with a dedication. In this dedication gratitude was also expressed for his activity as Reich Protector; this caused NEURATH to tell me in lengthy detail that "the Fuehrer was lying". In this connection he mentioned as a particular example that HITLER had outrageously lied to him and deceived him in his capacity as Reich Protector in Prague by regularly confronting him with HIMMLER and his Gestapo. At the time when NEURATH induced, I might almost say forced, to take over the Reich Protectorate, NEURATH told me

H0679 – 0015

that, in numerous discussions with HITLER, he had rejected assumption of the Reich Protectorate, that finally however, out of patriotic considerations, he declared himself willing to accept the post, after HITLER had definitely assured him that he NEURATH, would have full power in Bohemia and Moravia and in particular would have the entire Police Force subordinate to him. NEURATH wanted to avoid any martyrdom of Czechs in Bohemia and Moravia. He was of the opinion on principle that, as Reich Protector he would only permit a Czech to be sentenced in those cases in which, according to existing State agreements and laws, a wrong had been done. He strongly advocated this principle. By chance I personally witnessed a telephone conversation which he had with PRAGUE from the Reichchancellery in Berlin. I am no longer quite sure whether with State Secretary FRANK or with Mr. von BURGSDORFF, which concerned the execution of a prominent Czech and whereby he categorically and emphatically declared in a raised voice, that he would under no circumstances permit a martyr to be made in the case being discussed at the time. NEURATH told me in this connection how difficult matters were being made for him in Bohemia and Moravia through the encroachments of HIMMLER and his mouthpieces and that, in spite of various reports to HITLER, he was recieving no support from that side.

I know from NEURATH personally that the difficulties arising thereby led to his resignation as Reich Protector. As I recall this was in 1941. NEURATH himself told me that after his resignation HITLER repeatedly begged him actually to continue in the Protectorate; that he however consistently refused. Against NEURATH's wishes he continued to be regarded as Reich Protector. In reality he was on his estate in LEINFELDEN from 1941 on, which I know definitely, since particularly at this time I was in frequent touch with NEURATH. What happened in PRAGUE after his resignation, took place through HEYDRICH and DALUEGE without him, without any possible influence on his part. HIMMLER's mouthpieces were also to blame previously for many things done without his knowledge. This too I know from NEURATH personally : He repeatedly told me and occasionally also wrote that he had no influence whatsoever on events, that he was not heeded, indeed, that it was altogether impossible for him to see HITLER.

When I asked him once, if as president of the Privy Council,

H0679-0016

he could not convene it and there present his grievances, he declared that, according to his experiences with HITLER, such a summons would have no effect at all. Noone would come anyway, if HITLER did not specifically approve.

Once - shortly after the STALINGRAD disaster - I seriously requested him to announce his willingness to accept the Reich Presidency; he did not reject this, in fact he declared that the time was not yet ripe. The idea of making NEURATH Reich President, was mentioned in many circles at that time. He had the approval of the German people as I believe and as I know from numerous discussions in reliable circles among all classes of the German people.

On the basis of the above explanations, I can, to the best of my will and conscience, make the following statements:

1. Upon HINDENBURG's express wishes, Konstantin von NEURATH entered the HITLER government for the purpose of assuring a peaceful German Foreign Policy and remained in it until 1937 or the beginning of 1938 in order to fulfil HINDENBURG's bequest until he realized that HITLER had resolved to go to war and that he, NEURATH could no longer alter this decision.

2. Konstantin von NEURATH, in his official activity as Minister at all times had the unshakable desire for peace, and on his part applied only peaceful measures and consistently refused any application of force. Measures such as restoration of military sovereignty and rearmament, with-drawal from the League of Nations and the Disarmament Conference, occupation of the Rhineland, were never meant by him to be aggressive nor intended as preparation for a future war of aggression. If a different policy was carried out in Germany, it was done behind his back and without his knowledge. Upon recognizing the actual intentions of HITLER and his Party members, he sent in his resignation.

3. Until 6 November 1937 - on 6 November I was with NEURATH, which can also be confirmed by others of his friends - Konstantin von NEURATH carried out an honest peace policy and desired peaceful understanding abroad, particularly with England and France. He was earnest and sincere in his peace protestations and peace proposals.

4. Konstantin von NEURATH only accepted the post as Reich Protector of Bohemia and Moravia, because he hoped personally to avoid injustices in Bohemia and Moravia, which

H0679 – 0017

were to be feared had the post been assumed by a prominent National Socialist, and this only, after HITLER had definitely assured him, that he, NEURATH, alone would have full power and that the Police force would be subordinated exclusively to him. Actually HITLER sabotaged this solemn assurance from the beginning, and did not subordinate the Police authority to him, NEURATH, but rather had it exercised by HIMMLER and his mouthpieces. These conditions led to the greatest conflicts between NEURATH and HIMMLER, as well as the latter's political friend, FRANK, and finally, as a result of HITLER's complete failure, to his resignation in the fall of 1941.

5. As to family, education, and subsequent experiences, Konstantin von NEURATH is in every way a stable personality of most superior ideals, love of truth and honesty. Today he still enjoys the complete confidence of the German people. It may be assumed to be impossible for NEURATH consciously to have given to foreign diplomats and governments false assurances and confirmations for the purpose of deception. In my opinion and that of many other Germans, he definitely would not have openly jeopardized the respect and confidence which he enjoyed through deceitful behavior. He is entirely too conscious of responsibility for that and also too much bound by religious and humane considerations.

6. Konstantin von NEURATH was never a National Socialist; he was also never regarded as one. The circles from which he came considered him the exponent of their own viewpoint and hoped that through his stay in the government, they might see the government avoid drifting off into extravagant plans. His resignation from the government was viewed with the greatest concern for the more distant future.

7. In spite of the gold Pary-emblem bestowed upon him, Konstantin von NEURATH never considered himself a Party member. He was merely the curbing force in HITLER's government who, in contrast to the conception of HITLER and the NSDAP, represented HINDENBURG's bequest and the good old diplomatic school. He was an opponent of violence with which the NSDAP attempted to rule and tried to walk the road of peaceful negotiations in opposition to the NSDAP.

8. After HINDENBURG's death, Konstantin von NEURATH remained in HITLER's government only because HINDENBURG had requested him to remain in the government as long as possible, and that as a retarding influence.

In opposition to the arrogance of HITLER's Party members, he had a most difficult position in HITLER's government: his patriotic views and his

H0679 - 0018

personal sense of responsibility repeatedly caused him to make the sacrific of persevering and hindering violent measures on the part of government. He did not remain in the government because he was a confirmed National Socialist but because he wanted to oppose National Socialist behavior with the weight of his personal esteem among the German people and abroad, thereby facilitating and enabling a peaceful discussion with the other countries. I have made the above declaration on the basis of many years of definite personal knowledge of the defendant NEURATH:
I am making it with knowledge of my responsibility and duty as a German and as a witness before Court. Before handing in this declaration, I checked everything. I guarantee the correctness of the above declaration according to my duty and conscience and in lieu of oath.

s/ MANFRED ZIMMERMANN.

H0679 - 0019

Filed June 22

Neurath No .....3.....

Defense Exhibit No. .....

Declaration in Lieu of oath

of Baroness Ritter, Muenchen-Lochhausen.

Neurath No. 3 .....

Defense Exhibit No.....

DECLARATION IN LIEU OF OATH

of Baroness RITTER.

I and my family have been connected with Mr. von NEURATH by a friendship of long standing, which dates back to the time of his activity as ambassador in Rome in 1932/30. My husband was for 25 years Bavarian Ambassador to the Holy See, until in 1934 the Embassy was withdrawn by the National-Socialist government and my husband was retired. From that time one we have been living at Munich. However, the close personal contact with NEURATH was maintained, even after my husband's death in the year 1940. As the result of our confidential relationship, Mr. von NEURATH, in conversations and also in letters, expressed his criticism with regard to the general political development and his worries about the future resulting from it completely without reservation. I have carefully burned his numerous letters to us, with the exception of two letters, which happened to be left over, because as the result of their frankness, they were a source of danger for the recipient, as well as for the author. The contents of the letters and the frequent conversations, however, are still well-marked in my memory in their major points, the more so since frequently they contained particularly plastic statements.

I therefore am in the position to make the following statements from memory, which might be of importance in judging NEURATH's attitude, and certify their correctness in lieu of oath:

The motives of his taking over the position of Minister for Foreign Affairs in the summer of 1932 are shown in the letters

H0679 – 0020

which have still survived, and which I have turned over to Mr. von LUEDINGHAUSEN.

HINDENBURG had already requested NEURATH in the year 1929 to accept the position of Minister for Foreign Affairs, and that immediately after the death of STRESEMANN. NEURATH refused this, since he personally did not feel any tendency to take over this thankless office. HINDENBURG requested him once more; NEURATH again refused. On this occasion HINDENBURG drew the promise from NEURATH, to overcome his personal motives and to accept the position in the interest of the German people, if he (HINDENBURG) should consider this necessary at any time as urgently necessary in the interests of the people. This period of time arrived in the summer of 1932. HINDENBURG telegraphed to NEURATH and NEURATH now gave his agreement in accordance with his promise to enter into the government. When in the year 1933 a new government was formed under HITLER as Reich Chancellor, HINDENBURG made the condition to HITLER that NEURATH would have to remain Minister for Foreign Affairs. In accordance with this HINDENBURG asked NEURATH to stay, and NEURATH fulfilled HINDENBURG's request in accordance with his previous promise. I know, that NEURATH in the course of time frequently harbored considerable misgivings, then but was of the opinion that it was his patriotic duty to remain.

In this connection an especially fitting comparison with a large rock comes to my mind, which right in the middle of the river can decrease the force of the roaring current, while on the shore it would remain without influence. He frequently stated: "If the Germans often wonder that I am cooperating with this government, then they always think only of the bad conditions without appreciating how much disaster in excess of it I am still able to prevent. They forget what strength it takes to advance alone to HITLER through the wall of the "Myrmidons" (satellites)."

H0679 - 0021

H0679 - 0022

As far as the foreign-political basic principles of Mr. von NEURATH are concerned, he has never come to the idea of reaching their aims, especially gaining effective equality by any way other than negotiations. He furthermore refuted the tendency pursued by HITLER and later on also by von RIBBENTROP of close ties with Italy and Japan, and likewise the extensive aloofness to the Soviet-Union. In this connection he voiced his fear that HITLER, who knew exactly that he could not be able to move him (NEURATH) to this kind of politics, would "find politically unbiased and pliable people without scruples", who would take over the execution of such intentions.

NEURATH has always shown himself as a positive and convinced Christian, and attempted to guard the interests of the Churches, insofar as he could use his influence in this.

I remember especially well the case of the intended establishment of a Christian-Weber Hunting Museum in the cloister of the English Ladies in Nymphenburg near Munich. Here Mr. von NEURATH through his intervention succeeded, in that at least the church and part of the cloister buildings were left for the Order.

He displayed the same tolerant attitude toward the Jewish question which he had shown toward the Christian confessions. He therefore fundamentally refuted HITLER's racial policy. He also practically succeeded in preventing any elimination of Jews under his jurisdiction until the year 1937. Furthermore, he also helped whenever

H0679 – 0023

possible all persons who were close to him professionally or personally and who had been affected by the legislation for Jews, so far as he was able to do, in order to deliver them from financial and other disadvantages.

When Mr. von NEURATH had to recognize for the first time from HITLER's statements on 5 November 1937, that the latter wanted to achieve his political aims by using force toward the neighboring states, this shook him so severely mentally, that he suffered several severe heart-attacks.

He discussed this with us in detail on the occasion of his visit on New Year's day in 1938, and we found him to be very much suffering physically and spiritually. He was above all very shaken by the fact that HITLER in the meantime had refused to receive him and could not see any possibility under these circumstances of drawing the latter from his plants, which he condemned to the utmost. "It is horrible to play the part of Cassandra", he often said. He categorically declared that he could not participate in this policy under any circumstances, and that he would draw the immediate consequences from this. He did not falter from this decision either, when HITLER declared to him on 2 February 1938, his 65th birthday, that he could not do without him. He discussed this with us the same evening during a congratulation-telephone call.

During the Munich conference in September 1938, we met Mr. von NEURATH daily, and he was still full of the great success of making this conference possible, which was reached by him under innumerable difficulties.

His motives for taking over the position as Reich Protector was explained to us by Mr. von NEURATH with the fact that the policy toward the Czechs would have to be restrained as much as possible, and that therefore he would have to take over this

H0679 - 0024

thankless office, in order to prevent its changing into a radical direction He wrote to us about this:" Now the disaster has happened through the action in Czechoslovakia. As long as HITLER lives it will probably be impossible to undo this. However, perhaps I will be successful in preventing the disaster from assuming yet greater dimensions, by having the war fever affecting the remaining nations also. For everyone who knows him it is completely out of the question that personal ambition could have influenced him it is completely out of the question personal ambition could have influenced him in accepting this office.

During his Prague term of office he constantly intensively tried to counter the course requested by the SS toward the Czechs. In connection with this he once wrote: "It is impossible to support government sovereignty solely on bayonets."

The following place in a letter throws a beam on his relations with HIMMLER
"
On Christmas HIMMLER gave us a little bag with real coffee.
This appeared so unmotivated to me, that it may be assu assumed that he might want to poison me. I have therefore prohibited the use of the coffee."

NEURATH expressed himself as follows in a letter with regard to the plans for Germanization and or slow assimilation of the Czechs: "Quite aside from the sensible point of view, the people, which are just to be resettled, arouse pity in one's soul. However, I believe that I have discovered a way now to prevent disaster. Time won is everything won and frequently, postponing is giving up."

He frequently spoke and wrote of the fateful roll of Staatssekretaer FRANK whom he despised to the utmost from the human and political stand point, especially since he constantly worked against him in every respect.

H0679 - 0025

Neurath informed us of the incidents accompanying the student revolts in Prague in November 1939 in an explicit courier letter and on the occasion of a visit with us a short while later. One morning in the middle of November a conference took place among von Neurath with Frank and Hitler in the Reich Chancellery. This followed a quiet course, and neither executions or concentration camps for the students were mentioned. Neurath then departed while Frank remained in the room with Hitler and now discussed with Hitler the tangible measures against the students without knowledge and in the absence of Neurath. Frank drove immediately from the Reich Chancellery to the airfield, and flew back to Prague in Neurath's airplane and without the latter's knowledge, where he immediately carried out the measures authorized by Hitler, without waiting for Neurath to return first. Neurath returned to Prague by railroad, where he did not arrive until the next day. Immediately after his return he was informed of what had happened in the meantime - as far as I can remember by Mr. von Burgsdorff - and he was shown a copy of the proclamation signed with his name, which had already been posted all over the city. He then immediately called for Frank and expressed his indignation about the unfairness and the illegality of his acts, especially the misuse of his name. He was hofrified about the brutality and short-sightedness of the measures against the students. Frank replied that after all, he had only carried out Hitler's order. Neurath furthermore was deeply hurt that Hitler had betrayed him by issuing these orders behind his back. He later on expressed to us with regard to this matter, that he would have initiated Frank's arrest immediately if the latter had not been able to refer to Hitler's order. He was especially depressed about the fact that not only had the orders been issued by Frank under misuse of his name, but also above all that

H0679 - 0026

the executions had already been carried out prior to his arrival in Prague.

On the occasion of his next meeting with Hitler, Neurath requested his dismissal on the basis of this incident. Hitler replied to this with the assurance that the imprisoned students were to be released and the schools of higher education were to be reopened. As far as I can recall, Neurath then stated to Hitler that he would remain in office only long enough until a successor could be found and the administrative apparatus were running smoothly, and then only remained under this condition. In the autumn of 1941, Hitler demanded the execution of very severe measures against the Czechs from Neurath, which Neurath refused. He also refused to remain in office if Heydrich, as Hitler suggested, were to take over the execution, and left Prague for good. For 2 years Hitler requested him repeatedly and emphatically to return to Prague which however was persistently refused by Neurath.

s/ Theda Freifrau von Ritter

Muenchen- Loshhausen, 28 May 1946

H0679 – 0027

Filed June 22

Neurath No. 4

Defense Exhibit No. .....

Affirmation in lieu of oath

of Ambassador (retired) Kurt Pruefer

16 April 1946

H0679 - 0028

Neurath No. 4.....

Defense Exhibit No. .....

City of Geneva,)
Canton of Geneva,) SS:
Confederation of Switzerland,)
Consulate of the United States of America.)

Before me, J.BROCK HAVRON, American Vice Consul, in and for the consular district of Geneva duly commissioned and qualified, personally appeared CURT PRUEFER who, being duly sworn, deposes and says as follows:

(1) My name is CURT PRUEFER and I reside at 1 Avenue EMILE JUNG, Geneva, Switzerland.

(2) I hereby declare that the answers which I have given to the questions numbered one through twenty written in the German language and attached hereto are true and correct to the best of my knowledge an belief.

(Sgd.) .Curt Pruefer.
Curt PRUEFER.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this sixteenth day of April, 1946

(Sgd.) ..J.Brock Havron..
J.Brock HAVRON

(Seal of the American Consulat in Geneva, Switzerland.)

Vice Consul of the United States of America.

Official Service No. 1016
Fee nil equal T.T.38

Bern, Switzerland
16 April 1946

I certify that I witnessed the signing of the above appearing signatures

(Sgd.) Davis O. Harrington
DAVIS O. HARRINGTON
Lt.Col., G.S.C.
Summary Court
Office of the American Mil.Attach

NEURATH Document No. 4.....

Defense Exhibit No. .....

Questions to be answered by the witness Ambassador Kurt PRUETER:

1) What positions did the witness hold during his dipomatic career?

2) Since when has the witness known the defendant?

3) Where and how, that is, through whom, did the witness come to know the defendant?

4) Did the witness work with, or under the orders of the defendant, outside of the Reich Foreign Office and, if so, what positions did he hold?

5) Is the witness familiar with the political attitude of the defendant as regards Germany's foreign policy from World War I until HITLER and his party came to power in January 1933?

6) What policy did the defendant pursue in his different posts, up to the moment when, in June 1932, he took over the Reich Foreign Office?

7) Is it known to the witness that the defendant joined the HITLER government as Minister of the Reich Foreign Office only at the explicit request of the then Reich President von HINDENBURG, and that he did so merely because of his veneration for the Reich President?

8) Does the witness know for what reason Reich President von HINDENBURG desired this and that he saw in the defendant the guarantee for a continuation of the outright peace policy which Germany had so far pursued?

9) Did the defendant play an active part in any way in the transfer of power to HITLER, in January 1933?

10) Is the witness at all familiar with the defendant's attitude at that time towards HITLER and the NSDAP, or National Socialism in general?

11) From when and until when did the witness work in the Foreign Office under the defendant, and what was his position?

12) What was the foreign policy pursued by the defendant when Foreign Minister

13) Did the defendant know that HITLER, when he assumed power already had the intention of or a plan for carrying his plans and intentions of foreign policy into effect, if necessary by force of arms; in other words, through war, or had the defendant reason to assume this?

H0679 - 0029

H0679-0030

14) Did the witness know whether HITLER did or did not approve of the peace policy endorsed and pursued by the defendant and which was aimed at avoiding warlike conflicts ?

15) How and in what way did this become manifest ?

16) What did the Party, particularly the so-called Ribbentrop Office, and the Party's foreign organization, think of the defendant's foreign policy?

17) Did the Party oppose this policy of the defendant and with what means?

18) Did the defendant object to the Party's attempts to interfere in his policy and was he succcessful?

19) Did the defendant place himself const ntly on guard against intrusion by nationalsocialist elements, especially against the assignment of Party members as functionaries in his ministry?

20) Did the defendant succeed in this?

1) Entered the foreign service in 1907, to be trained as interpreter at the consulate in Cairo. 1909 transferred to Consulate General, Cairo, where he remained until December 1913. Resigned from the service in order to become an unsalaried lecturer for semitic languages in Munich. At outbreak of World War I reported for army service. Served as soldier in Turkey from September, 1914, until 1917. Then called to embassy in Constantinople. There until end of war. Afterwards until spring of 1920 in Garmisch (Bavaria) as a private individual. Recalled to foreign service and appointed Legationsrat (first secretary.). In 1923 appointed section chief in the home service of the Foreign Office. 1924 on leave in Switzerland because of tubercular lung trouble. Soon afterwards appointed administrative chief of consulate in Davos. In 1925 appointed Consul General in Tiflis; 1927 Minister in Addis Abeba. 1930 called to Foreign Office as section chief in home service of foreign office, and ministerial director. In 1936 director of budget and personnel section. On 1 January 1939 on leave because of ill health. May 1939 appointment as Ambassador in Rio de Janeiro. Departure for that post in September 1939. Return to Germany in October 1942. In May 1943 on leave because of ill health. For same reason departing for Switzerland in September 1943. Since then here until further orders retired from active service since November 1944.

2) I made a superficial acquaintance with Baron von NEURATH in 1915, when I was in Turkey during the first world war. At that time he was counsellor of embassy in Constantinople. I saw him more frequently when he was Ambassador in Rome.

3) My parents lived in Rome and my sister was employed in the embassy. As a result I was frequently in Rome on visits and in that manner came into closer contact with the Ambassador.

H0679 – 0031

H0679 - 0032

II

4) No.

5) From the First World War until 1933, the general line of German foreign policy under all cabinets was one of conciliation and understanding with our former adversaries. As long as I was active in the Foreign Office during this period word was given out by all foreign ministers over and over again that Germany's return to economic and social health is possible by peaceful means only, through compliance with the conditions imposed upon Germany by the Versailles treaty, no matter how severe they might be. The fact that at the same time German foreign policy endeavored by negotiations to soften the conditions of the Treaty of Versailles does not constitute a contradiction. All of Germany's representatives abroad were instructed accordingly; I myself, for instance, before my departure for Abyssinia. Undoubtedly, Herr von NEURATH received similar instructions and carried them out.

6) Among officials of the foreign service Baron von NEURATH was regarded as a champion of the policy of a German rapprochement to Great Britain and as a supporter of an understanding with the western powers especially, at the same time rejecting any solution of European questions by violence. He is a typical prototype of the South German, in his case of the Swabian, aristocracy, which, in contradistinction to the Prussian junkers, is basically conservative and democratic. Speaking of him as an personality, Herr von NEURATH, in my opinion is by character a well-meaning, peace-loving sceptic, adverse to excesses and radicalism of all kinds.

H0679-0033

7) In the circles of higher-up functionaries of the Foreign Office none of whom at that time were in sympathy with National Socialism, it was a well known fact that when appointing Hitler as Reich Chancelor Hindenburg had, so to speak, attached the condition that Neurath should remain in office as Foreign Minister. Baron Neurath was in no way anxious to obtain this office when he assumed it in 1932. On the contrary, as early as 1929, when Hindenburg had asked him to accept the ministerial post, he had declined on the ground that, not being a member of a party and thus being without party support, he could not consider his appointment to a ministry as suitable in a country ruled according to the parliamentary principle. It was not until 1932, when Reich President von Hindenburg, whom he venerated deeply, formed his first so-called presidential cabinet, that Neurath dropped his scruples and entered the cabinet as foreign minister.

8) In as much as Hindenburg was a conservative, his basic political attitude was probably about the same as that of Baron Neurath. There was no doubt in the mind of anybody with even a moderate understanding of conditions, that Hindenburg himself in vesting power in Hitler, had done this only most reluctantly and yielding to the heavy pressure of developments in the field of home policy. If, under such curcumstances, he insisted and made it a condition that Baron Neurath his former adviser in the foreigh field, remained in office, this undoubtedly was due to the fact that within the seething new forces, which were surely displeasing and unsympathetic to him personally, he wanted to assure himself of one steady pillar, at least for foreign policy, that is, for peace.

H0679 - 0034

IV

9) As far as I know, no. In view of what is known to me of Neurath's political views this appears highly improbable to me.

10) Baron von Neurath was not a National Socialist. By upbringing and tradition he even was decidedly against the doctrines of National Socialism, to the extent that they endorsed radical and violent principles. This aversion, which he did not attempt to conceal was particularly directed against excesses of Party Spokesmen towards people with different views, especially with regard to the Jews and persons of partly Jewish ancestry; beyond that against the all-around interference of the National Socialist party in every vital expression of the German people and state; in other words against the claim of totalitarianism, the Fuehrer principle, briefly against dictatorship. Especially during the years 1936, until early 1938, when in my capacity as head of the budget and personel section I saw him very frequently, Baron von Neurath expressed himself to me and to others in unmistakeable terms as to how much concern and aversion he felt toward the progressively more extreme tendency in German internal and foreign policy. He especially complained that not only Hitler but also numerous other party elements interfered constantly, and often behind his back, in the Reich foreign policy which really was entrusted to him alone; that they disturbed its uniform course and thereby caused irreparable trouble.

11) I was at first section chief of the home service in the Foreign Office (Vortragender Legationsrat) and head of what then was section III (Great/ Britain, North and South America, the

H0679-0035

Near East); from 1936 on I served under him as head of the budget and personnel section, during the entire time when Reich Foreign Minister Freiherr von Neurath was in the Foreign Office.

12) Neurath's policy was one of international understanding, and peace. This policy was not in contradiction with the fact that Herr von Neurath also strove for a revision of the hardships resulting from the Versailles Treaty. However, he wanted to bring this about exclusively through negotiations, in no case by force. All his utterances and directives, which as his assistant I ever heard or saw, tended in that direction. The fact that Baron Neurath considered himself as a defender of the peace is perhaps best illustrated by a statement he made when leaving the foreign office. He declared at that time among a small group of his colleagues that now war could probably no longer be avoided. He probably meant by this that from now on the foreign policy would be transferred from his hands into those of thoughtless persons. Even after his resignation he remained loyal to his peace policy when - I believe it was on 27 September 1938 - he remonstrated with HITLER, saying that in order to get out of the impasse to which German policy had been brought after the GODESBERG meeting, the latter might suggest a four-power conference. The fact that he had made such remonstrations to HITLER was generally discussed at the time in the foreign office and considered very much to his credit.

13) I am certain that Baron von NEURATH, as well as other career officials in the Foreign Office, had no concrete knowledge of any possible

H0679-0036

plans for violence on HITLER's part. On the contrary, during the first years after the change of government one lent general credence to the oft-repeated protestations of peaceful intentions by the National Socialist leaders. I am even of the opinion that the latter themselves, especially during the first years, did not want to bring about a war. Rather, was it believed and hoped in the higher circles of the Party - where NEURATH did not count at all - that it would be possible to continue reaping cheap laurels without war through the hitherto successfully practised tactics of bluff and sudden surprise. It was not until later that the megalomania arising from success and a belief in their own luck and their own infallibility and invincibility, which had become mystical through unrestrained sycophantism, led HITLER and his immediate entourage to include war among their instruments of political power. We, the functionaries of the foreign service, and with us Baron NEURATH our chief, became aware of this development, only gradually, as outsiders. Until about the beginning of 1936, only a very few functionaries had been admitted, into the Party which, on its part, treated the staff of the office, including the recently admitted members, with suspicion and distrust. None of us, including Baron NEURATH, had any real knowledge of the true aims and intentions of HITLER and his inner circle. Cabinet meetings hardly ever took place. The Foreign Minister had to make a special application for every audience with HITLER, and these audiences almost always dealt only with individual questions.

H0679 - 0037

14) I am unable to estimate to what extent and until when, approximately, HITLER inwardly approved of von NEURATH's policy which stood for peaceful solution of all pending questions. In any case, I was under the impression that Baron von NEURATH's influence which was decisive in his office from the beginning of the National Socialist aera, up until HINDENBURG's death, declined steadily and with ever increasing speed, as to her influences originating in the Party made themselves felt in matters of foreign policy. By this I do not mean to say that these influences were deliberately working to bring about war. In any case, however, they finally became so strong that Baron von NEURATH, who under no circumstances would agree to war, was forced out of office.

15) The fact that HITLER considered NEURATH as an unsuitable foreign minister for carrying out the operations he had planned to bring about in Austria, Czecho-Slovakia and Poland, is fully evidenced by the fact that early in February 1938, namely before the Anschluss, he dismissed him, abruptly. This dismissal, which was also a complete surprise for the highest officials of the foreign office took place in an unsually blunt and almost insultingly precipitant manner, only two days after the festive celebration of NEURATH's Sixty-Fifth birthday in the old presidential palace. Everybody in the foreign office took that to indicate a sudden change in system which the former minister was not willing to endorse or for which he was not considered suitable. We all were under the impression that Baron von NEURATH's appointment as president of the secret cabinet council, which was created ad hoc

H0679 – 0038

and which never convened, was merely a sugar-coating for the bitter pill, which almost turned everything into a mockery.

16) Herr von NEURATH frequently complained that his activity was disturbed by party organizations existing along side the foreign office which were concerned with questions of foreign policy, or questions which bordered on foreign policy. As a result, he found himself in constant apposition to von RIBBENTROP's office and frequently also to the NSDAP organizations representing the Party abroad. Open hostility finally arose between RIBBENTROP's office and the Foreign Minister. The extremely bad relationship between the Foreign Office, i.e. the official representative of the Reich's foreign policy and the irresponsible party office, which occupied itself with foreign policy at the same time, is particularly well illustrated in Amy Buller's book, published in London in 1943, entitled "Darkness over Germany". During a visit in Berlin the author had occasion to become acquainted with the relations existing between the Foreign Office and the so-called RIBBENTROP office from personal observation.

17) The fact that the Party worked for Baron von NEURATH's downfall is very clearly shown by his dismissal. The method probably consisted of an insinuation to the chief of state that NEURATH was no longer the proper person to represent the aims of HITLER's policy in the manner required.

18) Baron NEURATH conducted a constant battle against interference by party offices. He frequently complained of such interference and mentioned

H0679 – 0039

that he had asked for Hitler's intervention. His influence with the latter, however, was constantly nullified by the far stronger influence of the Party. As a purely nominal party member, whose membership had been forced on him in order to present a unified picture of the cabinet abroad, he never had access to the inner circle of Hitler's intimate friends, who always regarded him with distrust. On the whole, Hitler saw in the career officials only troublesome doubters and indecisive admonis - who all too much were "sicklied o'er by the pale cast of thought." Neurath was well aware of this situation and because he suffered under it, he repeatedly offered his resignation, particularly so, after the death of State Secretary von Buelow. At that time the Party urged - that a Party man should be appointed in place of Buelow, whom they particularly hated. As a result of Neurath's stubborn resistance a solution was not reached until after a crisis lasting nine months and which ended in a victory for Neurath in that his son-in-law, Mackensen, a career diplomat, received the post of State Secretary.

In many cases, Neurath intervened in behalf of members of his foreign office staff who were objected to by the National Socialists for reasons of race, of creed or because of former affiliation with other parties. As an example, a number of functionaries who were Jews, or partly of Jewish ancestry, remained in office up until the time of Hindenburg's death; in fact, there were even promotions made among such officials.

H0679 - 0040

It was not until after HINDENBURG's death, when the final decision in all questions concerning civil servants was withdrawn from the Reich Foreign Minister, as well as from the other office chiefs, be a decree of the Fuehrer and transferred to the Fuehrer's deputy, that the radicalism of the Party got the upper hand and, especially after NEURATH's dismissal, assumed ever more disagreeable forms.

19) In questions relating to the treatment of civil servants, NEURATH at all times considered only actual suitability, disregarding the question of party membership. Consequently, he was unfriendly to all candidates who paraded their membership in the NSDAP and their service in the Party. He tried as much as possible to maintain the old nucleus of proven civil servants and to enlarge it from congenial and professionally suitable groups.

20) A particularly outstanding case was that of State Secretary von BUELOW. BUELOW was an outspoken enemy of National Socialism and he admitted this openly. He consisted the movement as an evil whose reign would shortly be overcome and which one would have to try and outlast. Therefore, a vigorous agitation was carried on against him by the Party. In spite of this, NEURATH held on to his State Secretary until the latter's death in 1936.

(receipt stamp of the International Military Tribunal, Nuernberg, with the date 24 April 1946)

Certified true copy

(signed) Baron v. LUEDINGHAUSEN
(Dr. Baron v. LUEDINGHAUSEN)
Attorney-at-law and notary public.

(Page 35 of Orig.)

Neurath No..6...

Defense Exhibit No.....

Filed June 22

Chipher telegram of the State Secretary of Foreign Office Bernhard von BUELOW to Ambassador Baron von NEURATH in London dated 31 May 1932.

H0679 - 0041

(Page 36 of Orig.)

Neurath No ...6....

Defense Exhibit No .....

Telegram from Berlin 31 May 1932 3.45 p.m.

" received in London 31 May 1932 4.30 p.m.

No 344 Urgent.

For the Ambassador personally.

To be deciphered by himself.

The Reich President request you, in view of your prior favorable statements, to take over the Foreign Ministry in the presidential cabinet about to be formed, which will be made up of right wing personalities free from political party allegiance and is to rest less upon the Reichstag than upon the authority of the Reich President. The Reich President addresses an urgent appeal to you, not to refuse your services to the Fatherland in these serious hours. Should you not be able immediately to give a favorable answer, please come immediately.

Telegraphic message.

BUELOW.

H0679 – 0042

Filed June 22

(Page 37 of original)

NEURATH NO. 8

Defense Exhibit No. .....

Letter of the Ministerialdirektor DR. KOEPKE

to Ambassador RUEMELIN,

dated 2 June 1932

H0679-0043

H0679 – 0044

Lines 7 - 19 incl.:

The conversation with the Reich President who, by the way, is absolutely composed, cool, and determined, contrary to all other reports, went so completely according to program that hardly any of the points were left out which we had previously gone through. The old gentleman immediately designated NEURATH as his candidate. He did not offer the post of minister to BUELOW, but on the other hand, he started from the apparently seefevident presupposition that BUELOW would remain as State Secretary. The Reich President showed himself extremely gratified when BUELOW pointed out NEURATH to him as his candidate, also as well as of all the officials of the Foreign Office.

. . . . . .

Line 32 to end of page:

It is furthermore important to emphasize that the old gentlemen designated NEURATH as his candidate, and not as candidate of the Cabinet. BUELOW, immediately acknowledged this as correct and without delay sent a telegram to that effect to NEURATH, by order of the Reich President. The assertion that NEURATH answered evasively is incorrect. Rather,as could be expected and was determined by a telephone conversation

H0679 - 0045

Lines 1 - 14 incl.:

of CONSTANTIN II with his father afterwards he only answered that he would have to learn the composition of the Cabinetand its political aims in order to assume his final position, and that he would personally and immediately come to Berlin for this purpose. Late in the evening of the same day PAPEN was then entrusted with the formation of the Cabinet, and he called up BUELOW the same night, with the request to offer the Foreign Office to NEURATH. BUELOW was able immediately to reply that this had already been done directly by the Reich President. With this NEURATH was in a certain sense lifted out of the framework of the Cabinet, and was not unequivocally chained to its fate, as far as this is at all possible.

H0679 - 0046

Lines 12 - 15 incl.:

There is complete calm, order, and composure in the office. Every one is glad that NEURATH has,accepted the post of Minister and that the other candidacies are thus settled.

- - - - - - - - - - -

signed/ KOEPKE

H0679 - 0047

NEURATH No. 9

Defense Exhibit No. .....

Filed June 24, 1946

Excerpt from the Article "Germany"

from "Time" of 10 April 1933.

Excerpt from

Article "Germany" from "Time" Magazine for

10 April 1933.

All Pool's Day

On Friday of last week news cables from Berlin to the U.S. seemed to be hinting at more than they could say : one Alfred ROSENBERG -surely a strange name for a Nazi -had been appointed chief of the Foreign Policy Division of the National Socialist Party. Foreign Minister Baron Konstantin von NEURATH had offered his resignation and then withdrawn it. Three days later the world learned what had happened :

Appalled by the growing tide of world resentment against the Hitlerites and a Germany that could permit them to govern realizing what desperate harm this was doing the nation's industry, Baron von NEURATH and Vice Chancellor von PAPEN fought for hours against the proclamation of Adolf HITLER's Jewish boycott. In the end they rushed to old President von HINDENBURG . Baron von NEURATH offered his resignation, was finally persuaded to withdraw it. Old Paul agreed absolutely with his two Nationalist ministers and added a private complaint of his own : he had just learned that his name had appeared without authorization on anti-Jew proclamations in Munich. Like a naughty schoolboy Handsome Adolf HITLER was summoned to the Feldmarshal's office, and Handsome Adolf meekly backed down. He was willing to call off the boycott, he realized its folly, but what could he do ? Orders could not stop it, the Nazis would run wild. President von HINDENBURG reminded his Chancellor of his oath to defend the rights of all law-abiding citizens. He threatened to declare martial law and abolish the Government. Then a compromise was reached : the boycott would be declared, but for nine hours on Saturday only. And it must be peaceful.

H0679 – 0048

I hereby certify that above excerpt from "Time" of 10 April 1933 is a verbatim copy of the original before me.

(Dr. Baron von LUEDINGHAUSEN)

Attorney-at-law and Notary.

H0679 - 0049

Entd June 22

NEURATH No. 11

Defense Exhibit No. . . . . .

Letter of Baron von NEURATH the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs to Reich President von HINDENBURG dated 19 June 1933.

(Political report of the Economic Conference in London)

H0679 – 0050

H0679-0051

NEURATH No. 11.....

Defense Exhibit No. .....

Letter of Baron von NEURATH to Reich President von HINDENBURG.

At present London, 19 June 1933.

Dear Reich President:

About a year ago your Excellency's confidence called me from my London sphere to be head of the Office for Foreign Affairs. For the first time in a year I again stepped on the soil of London and that at the very moment when this city is the center of important foreign political events. The leading personalities of over 60 states are assembled here at a critical time. From long personal experience the location and the framework of this World Conference are familiar to me. Besides the immediate tasks set before me here by the conference it is my duty to keep in view the general situation and the general mood.

I am sorry I have to state that the impressions I received here are alarming to the highest degree.

By reason of the reports of the Chiefs of our Mission I was prepared for many bad aspects, for many gloomy events and for disturbing opinions of foreign countries. Nevertheless, despite all apprehensious I had hoped that various effects would be only transitory, that much could be settled. However, my apprehensious proved more justified than my hopes. I hardly recognized the City of London. I found a mood-first in the English world, then in international circles - showing a reaction in the political and psychological attitude towards Germany which cannot be considered seriously enough. I already have emphasized particular cases in the reports to Mr. Reich Chancellor which had been presented to me as reason or pretext for this reaction. The Jewish problem which has already been used in the Geneva League of Nations (Rat) Committee and in the Congress of the League of Nations Associations at Montreux to isolate us internationally and to h us is also distinctly perceptible every moment in the background of the foreign political events at the much more important London Conference. Also without any occasion at present it is being exploited against us, and until now no counter-arguments meet with any understanding. The English declare that in general they are dominated by sentiment on this question in their judgment of Germany.

H0679-0052

The King of England in a very serious conversation with me on Saturday last week, also brought this out unequivocally. Many Government Delegations brought renowned Jews to the conference. Besides the predominently sentimental exploitation of the Jewish problem the Austrian problem is now also in the foreground. All our adversaries - and in addition circles that are neutral in other respects - are making use of the Austrian affair to stress the idea of Germany as a presumable threat to international peace, accompanied by phenomena which are often distressing. In all shades, from the malice and mockery over the fact that Austria was obliged to defend herself against Germany to threats of intervention which I emphatically reject, this subject is discussed and used against us. As Chancellor DOLLFUSS appeared on the platform of the Conference he was applauded ostentatiously. The British Minister of Finance especially praised him in his speech. There was enthusiasm, when DOLLFUSS quoted SCHILLER and said that the best man cannot live in peace if it does not suit his bad neighbor. It was treated as a great sensation when the news of the arrest and the expulsion of the Press Chief of the Austrian Legation in Berlin arrived here. It was greeted noisily when he was instantly nominated Press Chief in London. All German statements concerning these events were disregarded. The "Times" published one of its sharpest articles against us and the excited echo of the French Press was received with approval by the circles of the Conference. An atmosphere prevails in which anything is accepted and undertaken readily that might harm and discredit us. Significant is the fact that even the Latvian Foreign Minister would have made use of the general prejudice against us in a speech about the butter-embargo, if I had not stopped it in time. An influential and Germanophile member of the English Cabinet explained to me seriously and impressively that there is no idea in Germany, how greatly the situation in London has changed since my departure and what great efforts the Cabinet had to make - (threat of dismissal of the Minister concerned) - in order to put through in Parliament a small economic matter concerning Germany. He added, that it was at present absolutely impossible to bring up the Anglo-German Commercial Treaty in the House of Commons.

In summary, I must characterize our situation, as far as I can judge it from here, as a growing isolation. The wish of our opponents, to restrict our most vital foreign political aims, is supported by the fact that they are fighting against us morally and will also involve in this ruthless fight those circles of nations which purely politically are in no way opposed to us. There is made of/the egotistic fight against the Austrian right of self-government, aginst the idea of annexation

H0679-0053

(Anschluss) a fight to rescue Austria from violent German procedure and thereby influence is also exerted on personalities who have not been on the side of our adversaries in the question of annexation (Anschluss It was comparatively easy for Mr. DALADIER to avoid discussions about disarmament. An atmosphere of distrust is being spread around us. My emphatic and constant counter-efforts are continually meeting with intentional misunderstanding.

I avoid giving further particulars about the reactions resulting from this situation especially in our relationship to Italy and Russia, as well as in the question of obtaining practical equality of rights, in the question of military-defense, in the application of the Four Power Pact and so on. I only wished, as summary of the impressions already explained to the Reich Chancellor in detail and for the preparation of the report, which I beg to be allowed to make to Your Excellc personally after my return, to sketch briefly a picture of the mood and the mood-making against which we have to fight at present in the world and the importance of which cannot be either overlooked nor extenuated.

That is all.

signed: Baron von NEURATH.

H0679-0054

Filed July 21, 1946

Neurath No. 12

Defense Exhibit No. 12

Letter of the Reich Foreign Minister
Baron von Neurath from the World Economic
Conference in London on 19 June, to
Hitler (1933)

H0679-0055

Neurath No. 12.....

Defense Exhibit No.....

Letter of Baron v. Neurath to Adolf Hitler

At present in London, 19 June 1933. Sir:-

I thought fit to submit to you immediately my report on the conference, and individual political questions in a general report on the atmosphere to the Reich President also.

I said in the conclusion of my immediate report that I intended in my subsequent report to deal with the individual problems separately. Accordingly, I should like to emphasize to you now a concrete danger which is as follows:

The French are following up with sharpest attention the "tension between Germany and Austria", as their press calls the recent occurrences. Their outward official restraint which can be observed must not lead to any delusion over the fact that they are intensely concerning themselves with the possibilities of international complications. From French sources I hear, for insfance, that Mr. Dollfuss is reported to have declared to French persons before starting upon his journey: " I have the energy to hold out but I do not have the power. What will happen if 30000 Nazis cross the frontier?". There are further rumors in Conference circles about a French statement that "Nazis armed with flame- throwers are posted at the frontiers of Austria," and it is declared that the climax of the European situation may come much sooner than has been expected.

It was to be feared that, in connection with this sort of rumor mongering, the French would attempt to create in international circles, a mood directed towards the idea of intervention- even military. This supposition has in fact been confirmed. I have, however, as has already been telegraphically reported through the Ambassador, succeeded for the time being in removing this danger. Nevertheless, the tendency of our attitude towards Austria must be watched, for the future as well.

Yours faithfully
signed: Baron von Neurath

To: Reich Chancellor Adolf Hitler, Berlin.

(Page 52 of
of orig.)

Filed June 2

Neurath No. 13

Defense Exhibit No....

Excerpts from

Ambassador DODD's Diary

1933/1937.

H0679-0056

H0679-0057

Neurath Nr. 13

Defense Exhibit No.....

From
"The Ambassador Dodd's Diary".

p. 148. (death of Hindenburg)
2. August 1934

"No member of th German Cabinet exept von Neurath had been allowed to visit Neudeck since July 11, not even his close friend von Papen"

p. 100. (conc, von Neurath)
March 6. 1934

"I am sorry for these clearer-headed Germans who know world affairs fairly well, who must work for their country and yet must submit to the Hitler-Goering-Goebbels ignorance and autocracy"

p. 237. (discussion with von Neurath)
April 4.1935

the Foreign Minister said: "Imperialistic talks and attitude worry me too." "The conversation lasted half an hour and it convinced me once more that von Neurath and perhaps all the higher officials of the Foreign Office are fully aware of the dangers of Hitlerism and that they press for their points of view in vain. Hitler really aims to annex all these areas and will in due time go to war for that purpose."

p. 93. (dinner at Roehm's)
February 23,1934

"von Neurath sat on my right and indicated that the League of Nations is essential to world economic recovery and added, Germany ought to return if economic questions were taken up in Geneva.

p. 251. (discussion with von Neurath, conc. Italian-Ethiopian conflict)
May 15.1935

"While nothing directly significant was said, I came away convinced that the Foreign Office people are doing their utmost to restrain Hitler and coax England into a breach with France and Italy."

H0679-0058

H0679-0059

p. 115. (conversation with von Neurath about question of Jews)
May 28,1934

"I repeated part of what I had said to Hitler about the wa Americans are trying to control profiteering by great financial interests. He said he was glad that I had informed Hitler, but I added that the Chancellor had not agreed with me. Von Neurath was silent for a moment after my remarks. It was plain that he was entirely of my way of thinking. He begged me to say to Washington that the outbreak was entirely contrary to the German Government purpose, but he did not commit himself on Hitler."

p. 114. (discussion with von Neurath, conc. a speech of Mussolini about necessity of wars)
May 28,1934

"von Neurath said: "That is like Mussolini; there are some fools in Germany who talk that way also; but there is no substantial element of the German people who want war."

Certified true copy

Dr. Baron v. LUEDINGHAUSEN

Attorney at law and Notary.

H0679-0060

Filed June 24

(Page 57 of Orig.)

NEURATH NO. 14

Defense Exhibit No. .....

Draft of a letter of Foreign Minister

Baron v. NEURATH to HITLER

25 October 1935

H0679-0061

NEURATH NO. 14

Defense Exhibit No. .....

The Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs

Berlin, 25 Oct. 1935

(Handwritten Note by Baron v. NEURATH:
Resignation rejected by Reich Chancellor.
Ribb. does not become Secretary of State).

Honoured Reich Chancellor,

In the conversation I had this morning with Secretary of State Lammers, he told me that it is your most urgent wish to fill the post of Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs by Ambassador von Ribbentrop. You had already brought me this plan for my consideration this summer. I have therefore had plenty of time to reflect upon the expediency and possibility of this appointment. To my deep regret, I have, in this respect, gained the conviction that I find it impossible for material and personal reasons to agree to this plan. In the first place, I do not think that Herr von Ribbentrop in fitted, even with the assistance of a trained official, to fill, in a manner consistent with the interests of the Reich, this position which requires a precise knowledge of international affairs, official machinery and that of the personnel at his disposal. Immoreover fear that Herr von Ribbentrop will not be able to remould substantially the staffing policy pursued by me in the equal interest of State and Party, apart from a few easily made alterations in the filling of posts abroad. Finally it is not possible for me, for personal reasons, to cooperate with Herr von Ribbentrop in the manner required for that properous collaboration between Secretary of State and Minister which is necessary and inevitable in the interests of the service. I must on no account, however, be an obstacle to the achievment of your purpose, and I therefore beg herwith to surrender to you the office of Reich Foreign Minister conferred upon me by the late Reich President von HINDENBURG and confirmed by yourself, and request that you relieve me as soon as possible of the conduct of the duties of my Office.

With the assurance of my unaltered respect,

I remain,

Yours faithfully

H0679-0062

Filed June 24

Neurath No. 15

Defense Exhibit No.....

Excerpt

from memorandum of conversation

between Bullitt, American Ambassador

to France and Baron v. Neurath, Reich

Foreign Minister, on 18 Mai 1936

(U.S. Document No. L 150)

H0679-0063

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Memorandum of Conversation between William C. Bullitt, American Ambassador to France, and the German Minister for Foreign Affairs, Von Neurath, in Berlin, on May 18, 1936.

I called on Von Neurath, Minister for Foreign Affairs, on May 18th and had a long talk on the general European situation.

Von Neurath said that it was the policy of the German Government to do nothing active in foreign affairs until "the Rhineland had been digested". He explained that he meant that until the German fortifications had been constructed on the French and Belgian frontiers, the German Government would do everything possible to prevent rather than encourage an outbreak by the Nazis in Austria and would pursue a quiet line with regard to Czechoslovakia. "As soon as our fortifications are constructed and the countries of Central Europe realize that France cannot enter German territory at will, all those countries will begin to feel very differently about their foreign policies and a new constellation will develop," he said.

. . . . . .

In discussing France, he said that he could swear to me that the deepest desire of Hitler was to come to a real understanding with France. He added that I knew from the many conversations we had had on this subject over a long period of years that to establish a France-German understanding had always been the core of his personal foreign policy. He then said he regretted that there seemed to him today not the slightest chance of bringing about a reconciliation between France and Germany. He asserted that every attempt he or Hitler had made to draw closer to the French had resulted in either no reply from France or a rebuff.

. . . . . .

Certified true copy-

(signed) Dr. Baron v. LUEDINGHAUSEN
(Dr. Baron v. LUEDINGHAUSEN

Attorney - at law and Notary)

H0679-0064

(Page 61 of orig.)

NEURATH No. 16

Defense Exhibit No. .....

Letter from the Reich Foreign Minister

Baron von NEURATH to HITLER,

dated 27 July 1936

with enclosed letter to MEISSNER

(copies)

H0679-0065

At present in
Leinfelden on the Enz, 27 July 1936
Post Enzweihingen (Wuerttemberg)

Dear Mr. MEISSNER,

Enclosed I am sending you a sealed letter to the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor and ask you to take cognizance of it personally and confidentially and then to transmit it closed to its destination. May I ask you not to tell anyone about the contents of this letter for the time being. But I did not wish to fail to notify you about the development of things.

With best regards,

yours

signed Baron von NEURATH

To the State Secretary and Chief
of the Office of the President (Praesidialkanzlei),
Dr. MEISSNER
at present Berchtesgaden

H0679-0066

At present Leinfelden on the Enz, 27 July 1936
Post Enzweihingen (Wuerttemberg)

Dear Reich Chancellor,

Corresponding with the instructions transmitted to me yesterday in Munich by Mr. von RIBBENTROP, I have directed the chargé d' affaires Prince BISMARCK to obtain from the English government the agreement for the nomination of the special and authorized Ambassador von RIBBENTROP as Ambassador of the Reich in London.

When RIBBENTROP transmitted the instructions and the enclosed document to me, he told me that he, as ambassador in London, had to accept no orders whatsoever from me, and that he was not subordinate to me, but that he had to handle German-English policies absolutely independently. With this adjustment any influence of mine on one of the most important spheres of German foreign policy is taken away from me, and the unity which according to my opinion is absolutely necessary in the direction of the foreign policy of the Reich determined by you is done away. I can no longer bear the responsibility for such a condition. In order to restore this unity, I know only one way out, that is for you yourself to take over the Ministry for Foreign Affairs nominally and at the same time entrust some State Secretary acceptable to you with the technical leadership of the agency. Anyhow, I myself can no longer remain at the head of the Foreign Office and therefore repeat my request made already in the fall of last year, to relieve me of my post as Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs, at the very latest, when Mr. von RIBBENTROP enters on his post as Ambassador in London. Adequate reasoning for this can be found without difficulty.

I affirm that no personal reasons play any part in putting request for relief from my office, but only the conviction that a division of responsibility in the leadership of foreign policy must be harmful to the Reich has made me take this step. Even when I am no longer minister, I shall always be at your disposal with my advice and my experience of many years in the field of foreign policy, if you should want them.

H0679-0067

I am going back to Berlin tomorrow, in order to fulfil the duties I still have in connection with the Olympic games.

Yours very respectfully,

signed Baron von NEURATH

H0679-0068

COPY

THE FUEHRER AND REICH CHANCELLOR

Appointment

I herewith appoint the Special and Authorized Ambassador of the German Reich

von RIBBENTROP

to the post of German Ambassador in London; he is to retain the authorities heretofore held by him. In this capacity he is directly under my jurisdiction and responsible to me.

signed Ad. HITLER

Bayreuth, 24 July 1936

(Enclosure with letter to HITLER, dated 27 July 1936.)

H0679-0069

Filed June 24

Neurath No. 17

Defense Exhibit No. .....

Extract from Sir Nevile Henderson:
Failure of a Mission, Berlin 1937 -
1939, London 1945.
P 50/51, 110.

H0679-0070

Sir Nevile HENDERSON: Failure of a Mission. P. 50/51, 110.

Baron von NEURATH was an astute and experienced Swabian who had been Ambassador in Rome and in London before becoming Minister for Foreign Affairs. Among the Germans, the Swabians enjoy a reputation for economy and dourness similar to that of the Scots among the English. He and his wife had been extremely popular in England, and I liked them both immensely. His charming daughter was the wife of the son of the veteran Field-Marshal v. Mackensen who worked under his father-in-law as Secretary of State, which is the equivalent of our permament Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs. Political director of the Ministry was Baron von Weizsacker, who had served as a naval officer in the war. There is no finer type than the hard-headed intensely German, but at the same time absolutely honest and honorable German official. Of such was Weizsacker, and he succeeded MACKENSEN about a year later as Secretary of State under RIBBENTROP. With all of those my relations were excellent, and the Ministry itself was a happy and united Department. It was to change later when it came under the direction of Baron von RIBBENTROP, but at that time my diplomatic colleagues and I were exceedingly fortunate.

Baron von NEURATH himself was a survivor of the HINDENBURG regime, and not yet a member of the Nazi party. He became one later, but at that time his position was somewhat anomalous, and one could not always be certain that he was fully cognizant of the views of HITLER and the inner council of the Party. There had even been at one time three kinds of Ministries for Foreign Affairs in existence simultaneously in Berlin: Herr ROSENBERG's, Herr von RIBBENTROP's, and the official Ministry in the Wilhelmstrasse. The former's activities had ceased before my arrival, but that of Herr von

RIBBENTROP, HITLER's Ambassador at large, still functioned to some extent, and must have constituted a considerable handicap to the official Department.

Moreover the all-important up-shot of the incident was to remove from HITLER's entourage two of his most moderate and respected advisers: BLOMBERG himself and Baaron von NEURATH. The replacement of NEURATH by RIBBENTROP was a major disaster.

I hereby certify that this is a true and exact copy of the original text.

s. Dr. Freiherr von LUEDINGHAUSEN

.....

Dr. Freiherr von LUEDINGHAUSEN

Attorney-at-law

H0679-0071

(Page 71 of the Original)

Neurath No ..18.....

Defence Exhibit No .....

Filed June 24

Address of the nuncio Msgr. Orsenigo, Dean of the Berlin Diplomatic Corps on the 65th birthday of the Reich Foreign Minister, Baron von Neurath, on 2 February 1938.

H0679-0072

H0679-0073

Neurath No. 18.....

Def. Exhibit No.....

ADDRESS

of the Nuncio Monsignore ORSENIGO, Dean of the Berlin Diplomatic Corps on the 65th birthday of the Reich Foreign Minister, Baron von NEURATH on

2 February 1938.

"The date which is shown by the hand on the clock of your life offers us, the heads of the diplomatic missions in Berlin, the desired occasion to express in festive style the feelings of hearty attachment and sincere devotion which binds us to your highly esteemed self. All of us wish to express our sincere thanks for the gratifying good relations which your Excellency has always shown to the members of the Diplomatic Corps. The diplomatic influence honorably exercised by your Excellency for many years in various nations, in the service of your country has imparted to you this calmness of judgment and friendly ease of approach which we were permitted to experience repeatedly during these years, so that our activity with you could always take place under the sign of benevolent understanding.

We, the heads of the diplomatic missions in this capital, wished to express our gratitude and our esteem with a modest memento. Will your Excellency accept the same with your customary friendliness and see in it at the same time our warm desire that you may be allowed to work for many more years for the best of your people and for maintenance of friendly relations between nations."

(Excerpt from the article "Diplomatic Corps congratulates NEURATH in "Berliner Boersen-Zeitung" of 3 February 1938.

Certified true copy

(signed) Dr. Baron v. LUEDINGHAUSEN

(Dr.Baron v.LUEDINGHAUSEN)

Attorney-at-law and Notary.

H0679-0074

(Page 72a of orig.)

NEURATH No. 20

Defense Exhibit No. .....

Filed June 24

"Failure of a Mission" HENDERSON

page 163 28 September 1938.

H0679-0075

Excerpt from

HENDERSON "Failure of a Mission" 28 September 1938

GOERING went to see HITLER between 10:15 and 11:15 and was joined ther by NEURATH, who had forced his way in uninvited. Both were in favour of a peaceful solution by negotiation.

(Page 163, 3rd para.)

Certified true copy:

(Dr. Baron v. LUEDINGHAUSEN)

Attorney-at-law

and Notary

H0679-0076

Filed June 24

NEURATH No. 21

Defense Exhibit No. .....

Letter of François - Poncet, French Ambassador, to Baron v. NEURATH, President of the Privy Cabinet Council, dated 13 October 1938.

H0679-0077

Translation (from French)

of the French Ambassador Francois PONCET's letter to Baron v. NEURATH, President of the Privy Cabinet Council.

FRENCH EMBASSY Berlin, 18 October 1938.

Dear Mr. President,

Your letter has touched me very much and I thank you with all my heart. But of us it is not I who have contracted the greater debt of gratitude. I have always found with you, even at the most delicate moments the most courteous, the most indulgent and the most confident reception. You made a difficult task easy for me. I shall never forget what I owe you.

The episode we have just experienced has shown that the peoples do not want war. In Europe there is a profound longing for peace and mutual understanding. It is perhaps most clearly manifested as far as France and Germany are concerned. The two axes are to be approached and the Munich agreement is to be developed. To that aim, I wish to apply myself when in Rome as well as in Berlin. The presence of your children in the Italian capital permits me to count upon your visit there. I rejoice over that in advance.

My wife and myself will be very glad to have lunch with you next Saturday and I will thus have the opportunity to tell Mrs. von NEURATH how much we have appreciated her smiling amiability and her never failing goodness during our long stay in Berlin.

Will you accept, dear Mr. President the assurance of my very high esteem and my faithful attachment.

(signed) Andre Francois PONCET.

Mr. Baron v. NEURATH.

H0679-0078

Filed June 22

NEURATH No. 24

Defense Exhibit No. .....

Manifesto by the Protestant
Pastor and by the Parish Council
of ENZWEIHINGEN

dated 6 May 1946.

H0679-0079

Manifesto.

The undersigned Protestant Pastor and Parish Council of ENZWEIHINGEN consider it a matter of honor and sentiment to make the following statement. We endorse in full the declaration, by which a great part of the citizens of ENZWEIHINGEN acknowledge their highly esteemed honorary citizen.

We confirm, that always and until now Herr von NEURATH remained faithful to his Protestant Church, attending the Services of his parish during his temporary visits to RHEINFELDEN and also proved his attachment to his Church and native community by important donations.

We have always known and esteemed him as a true nobleman. On the strength of his character and of some personal remarks, we consider his collaboration in the Third Reich as a proof of his faithfulness to his beloved people and his Fatherland as well as to the Reich President von HINDENBURG, whom he esteemed so highly, inspired by his hope to forestall evil by his advice and service and to direct as far as possible everything for the best. We are wholeheartedly grateful to him for his self sacrificing effort, and we would deeply regret if he should have to share the atonement for the heavy guilt of the real rulers, who rewarded his faithful service by ingratitude and contempt for his advice. We appeal to the sense of justice of the High Judges at NUERNBERG requesting them to acquit Herr von NEURATH, to enable him to enjoy a well-deserved evening rest by the side of his much-esteemed wife in the peacefulness of his home.

Z.B.

PASTOR ROLLER.

SEITZ, BUERGERMEISTER, KNOLL. REICHERT, CONRADT Im-

Schweitzerhof- P. LINCKH

For the accuracy of the above signatures
witnessed and attested

L.S. Protestant Pastorate - ROLLER.

Enzweihingen, 6 May 1946.

H0679-0080

Filed June 22

NEURATH Document No. 25

Defense Exhibit No. .....

Declaration in lieu of oath

by former Reich Finance Minister

Count SCHWERIN - KROSIGK.

H0679-0081

Question

1.) Since when have you known Herr v. NEURATH ?

2.) On what occasion did you make his acquaintance ?

3.) When did you become Reich Finance Minister ?

4.) Did Herr v. NEURATH take an active part in the proceedings which preceded the investment of the Chancellorship upon HITLER ?

5.) What was NEURATH's attitude towards HITLER and towards National-Socialism

6.) Did Herr von NEURATH pursue an absolutely peaceful policy and most rigorously rejected the use of force of any kind, let alone a war policy ?

7.) Was this indeed the reason for the Reich President von HINDENBURG insisting that Herr v. NEURATH should also remain in HITLER's government as Reich Foreign Minister, as the Reich President then saw a guarantee for the continuation of the hitherto peaceful policy of the German Reich ?

8.) Did you, at the time of the assumption of power by HITLER, know that HITLER had warlike intentions ?

9.) Did he, in the first years of his government, express such intentions to you ?

10.) Had you the conviction that HITLER, on taking over the government, and until the end of 1937, was determined to pursue a peaceful policy and that, accordingly, all his peace assurances and offers to the other powers were meant absolutely seriously ?

11.) Are you aware that HITLER had in these years the earnest and sincere desire to come to a peaceful agreement, primarily with England, but also with France ?

12.) Do you know anything about the fact that Herr v. NEURATH, with the approval and agreement of HITLER, has repeatedly attempted to establish better relations with England and France and to arrive at a lasting agreement with both these countries ?

H0679-0082

13.) Do you know anything as to whether HITLER, in this respect, was in complet accordance with Herr von NEURATH and his foreign policy ?

14.) When did you, for the first time, authentically learn that HITLER had decided to deviate from the peace policy so far pursued and shift to a policy directed towards war ?

15.) When did you become acquainted with the fact that HITLER, in autumn 1938, intended to annex the Sudetenland to the German Reich by force of arms ?

16.) What steps did you thereupon take ?
Did you immediately inform Herr von NEURATH and request him to dissuade HITLER and join in the efforts of the adversaries of this eventuality ?

17.) Did Herr von NEURATH immediately take steps ?
Which ?

18.) Is it thanks to these steps taken by Herr von NEURATH that the Munich Conference of late November 1938 resulted ?

19.) Had you already, before you wrote to von NEURATH in September 1938, heard of an intention of HITLER to march into Czechoslovakia ? If so, when, and through whom ?

20.) Are you aware that Herr von NEURATH was an adversary of a proceeding by force of arms against Czechoslovakia ?

21.) Did you, <u>after</u> the Munich Conference, hear of HITLER's intention to annex the rest of Czechoslovakia to the German Reich, in contradiction to his declarations in Munich ?
If so, from whom ?
Through whom ?

22.) Was Herr von NEURATH in close contact with the national or conservative circles/or did he have any sort of perceptible influence upon them ?

23.) How was his departure from the Foreign Ministry judged in these circles ?

24.) Had you any close connection with these circles ?
Were you a member of the German National Party ?

H0679-0083

25.) You called several times on Herr von NEURATH in Prague. Did he on these occasions speak to you of his relations with the Secretary of State K.H. FRANK?

26.) Did he tell you of his struggles with the Gestapo, the SD and the SS, owing to their arbitrary action and treatment of the Czech population ?

27.) Were you able, during your visits to Prague, to observe Herr von NEURATH' attitude towards the Czechs population and that of the latter towards him?

Signed: Dr. Baron v. LUEDINGHAUSEN
(Defense Counsel for the the Defendant v. NEURATH)

Nuernberg

10 April 1946.

H0679-0084

Answer:

To.: 1.) I cannot answer that precisely. I have know him well since 1932. Before that. I sometimes him when he was Ambassador in London . I cannot state the precise time.

2.) I cannot say.

3.) I became Reich Finance Minister on 1 June 1932 in the PAPEN Cabinet.

4.) So far as I know, no.

5.) Herr von NEURATH expected much of HITLER in the early period following 1933 and could in fact have at the time advised HITLER on foreign policy. As the years went on though, HITLER's self-confidence became ever greater the possibility of advising him flimsier. Von NEURATH became gradually troublesome to him as he did not endorse all HITLER's plans, and so the change from NEURATH to RIBBENTROP came about. NEURATH took up a critical attitude towards National Socialism, the acknowledged the positive sides which he believed he saw in National-socialism and criticised its evil sides.

6.) Von NEURATH believed that the aims of foreign policy which were, in his opinion, necessary for Germany, could be attained in a peaceful way and without violence. For these reasons, he was opposed to a war.

7.) Von HINDENBURG did not speak to me about it but I assume it.

8.) No.

9.) No, on the contrary.

10.) Yes.

11.) Every time he spoke about these things, in my presence, at all events he expressed himself to the effect that is was his desire to hive at peace with England and France.

12.) I know that Herr von NEURATH made such attempts and I must assume that these attempts were undertaken with HITLER's approval.

13.) So far as I know, this unity certainly existed in the early years, and two points of view slowly diverged. That was ultimately the reason for the replacement of Herrn von NEURATH.

H0679-0085

14.) I never learned it authentically.

15.) As there were no Cabinet meetings at the time, I was defendant on the Bulletins, to which every German citizen also had access.

16.) Having every reason to fear that a war might result, I wrote a letter to HITLER myself, warning him strongly against a war of any kind, and telephoned to von NEURATH, who was then in Wurttemberg, that it was high time he came to Berlin himself and threw the whole weight of his personality in favour of a peaceful solution of the Sudeten question.

17.) Herr von NEURATH came immediately to Berlin, went to HITLER and, as he later told me, intervened energetically in favour of a peaceful solution. He wiged acceptance of MUSSOLINI's offer of mediation.

18.) So I assume.

19.) No.

20.) I did not speak to Herr von NEURATH on this subject but I assume from his whole attitude that it certainly was so.

21.) No.

22.) As he comes from these circles himself, he had connection with them, certainly closer connections than with National-Socialist circles, and he had undoubtedly also influence on them.

23.) It was very much regretted, because he was recognised as representative of a peaceful foreign policy.

24.) With the Party, no. I had a number of acquaintance in these circles, with whom I was in touch.

25.) According to my recollection, he talked to me about FRANK and described him as unfit for his office. In NEURATH's opinion, it was a mistake in principle to place a Sudeten German in such a leading position because, as a result of his previous relations with the Czechs, he was bound to show a lack of the necessary objectivity towards them.

H0679-0086

26.) I do not remember precise details. He has, however, complained to me that the SS and SD were not completely subordinated to him and that in consequence another policy which he did not consider right was being pursued together with his own.

27.) I have only been able to note that von NEURATH's relations with the Czech President HACHA were good, one can even say friendly, and that when I drove by car - only once or twice of course - with von NEURATH through the streets of Prague, he was saluted respectfully.

Hersbruck, 18 May 1946.

(Count Schwerin von KROSIGK)

Interrogated by
Fred E. FENGER T/3
CI - Screening Staff
CIE No 4 Hersbruck.

H0679-0087

21 June 1946.

We, E.M. WITT, Civ., 344289, and WANDA S. TIESZEN, Civ., X 046265, hereby certify that we are thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of the original document.

E.M. WITT
Civ.,344289

WANDA S. TIESZEN
Civ.,X 046265